The Limits of  Public Interest by Strain, William S.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 33 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1971-1972 Term: A Symposium
Winter 1973
The Limits of "Public Interest"
William S. Strain
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
William S. Strain, The Limits of "Public Interest", 33 La. L. Rev. (1973)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol33/iss2/28
NOTES
of form and parol evidence. The courts have not explicitly
delimited this narrow exception, but it appears that there must
be a writing signed by the party who alleges that the contract
is invalid for lack of form; and that the non-signing party must
have manifested his assent to the contract by unequivocal acts.
As long as the application of this doctrine is confined to sit-
uations like Alley, no danger of fraud is likely, and the possible
harsh results which would result from rigid enforcement of for-
malities are averted. Given this consistent approach by Louisi-
ana courts, it is expected that this concept will be applied in
future cases.
William A. Jones, Jr.
THE LIMITS OF "PUBLIC INTEREST"
Plaintiff sued for allegedly defamatory statements pub-
lished by defendant in a magazine article on electronic eaves-
dropping. The article stated that plaintiff had persuaded a de-
tective previously hired by her husband to "sell out" and work
for her in connection with her ensuing divorce action. Defen-
dant urged that the New York Times v. Sullivan' doctrine denied
recovery to a "public official" or a "public figure" for a defama-
tory statement concerning them unless it was made "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether the statement was false or not. ' 2 The trial court
found the doctrine inapplicable because plaintiff was neither a
"public official" nor a "public figure." The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed and held the New York Times doctrine
applied to defamatory statements concerning private individuals
involved in matters "of public or general interest."3 Firestone
v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1972).
At common law, defamation is a false statement of fact
which tends to hold a person up to "public contempt, ridicule, or
shame."' 4 In order to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Id. at 280.
3. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1971).
4. Triggs v. Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n, 179 N.Y. 144, 154, 71 N.E. 739,
742 (1904); see also Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publ. Corp., 242 N.Y.
208, 151 N.E. 209 (1926); Bennet v. Commercial Advertiser Ass'n, 230 N.Y.
125, 129 N.E. 343 (1920). The same concept is worded somewhat differently
in RESTATEMENT O TORTS § 559 (1938): "A communication is defamatory if it
tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him In the estimation




does not have to prove falsity, he need only prove that the state-
ment was published and that it tends to hold him up to "hatred,
contempt, or ridicule."" Once the plaintiff has met this burden,
the only defense, other than truth, available is that the publi-
cation was made on a privileged occasion.6
The privilege urged by the defendant in Firestone originated
with the group privilege.7 Courts have long recognized the in-
terest of a group in freely discussing matters concerning it even
though the statements made might be defamatory of a member
of the group, or of one standing in some relation to it.8 Tradi-
tionally, this privilege has been limited to relatively small
groups.9 However, the privilege was extended by the Supreme
Court in New York Times v. Sullivan.10 The court held that the
first amendment prohibited recovery by a "public official" for a
defamatory statement relating to his official conduct unless he
5. RESTATEMENT or TORTS § 613 (1938):
"BURDEN OF PROOF
(1) In an action for defamation the plaintiff has the burden of proving,
when the issue is properly raised,
(a) the defamatory character of the communication,
(b) its publication by the defendant,
(c) its application to the plaintiff,
(d) the recipient's understanding of its defamatory meaning,
(e) the recipient's understanding of it as intended to be applied to
the plaintiff,
(f) special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication,
(g) abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion.
(2) In an action for defamation the defendant has the burden of prov-
ing, when the issue is properly raised,
(a) the truth of the defamatory communication,
(b) the privileged character of the occasion on which it was pub-
lished,
(c) the character of the subject matter of defamatory comment as
of public concern."
6. Id.
7. There are two types of privilege: absolute (RESTATEMENT Or TORTS §
583-92 (1938)), and qualified (RESTATEMENT ow TORTS §§ 593-612 (1938)). Abso-
lute privilege encompasses statements made by judges, legislators, and other
officials In the performance of their duties. In addition, truth has been called
an absolute privilege, but, in reality, it is an absence of defamation (Rm-
STATEMENT oF TORTS § 582 (1938)). The qualified privileges are (1) the de-
fense of one's self or property; (2) the defense of someone else's person or
property; and (3) the group privilege. Also, "fair comment" has often been
considered a qualified privilege, but actually it is an absence of defamation
rather than a privilege because it is a stated opinion based upon truth.
8. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 115 (4th ed. 1971). See also O'Connor v. Sill, 60
Mich. 175, 27 N.W. 13, rehearing denied, 28 N.W. 162 (1886) (educational
group); Clark v. McBaine, 299 Mo. 77, 252 S.W. 428 (1923); Mick v. American
Dental Ass'n, 49 N.J. Super. 262, 139 A.2d 570 (1958) (professional group);
Stewart v. Ging, 64 N.M. 270, 327 P.2d 333 (1958) (religious group).
9. W. PRoSSER, TORTS § 115 (4th ed. 1971).
10. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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proved that the statement was made with "actual malice-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not." It appeared that the decision
was merely an extension of the group privilege to the political
community. However, it soon became apparent that the case
produced more far-reaching results. In Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts12 and Associated Press v. Walker,' the court extended
the New York Times test to defamatory statements concerning
"public figures." In these cases, the athletic director of a large
university, and a retired army general were found to be "public
figures" within the New York Times test.
Further extension was seen in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,14
wherein the court held the test applicable to defamatory state-
ments about private individuals relating to their involvement
in events of "public or general interest."'1 There a private indi-
vidual sued a radio station that had broadcast several stories
concerning his arrest for selling obscene materials and his at-
tempt to have the police enjoined from interfering in his busi-
ness. The Supreme Court held that the sale of obscene literature
was a matter of "public interest" and that the New York Times
test did apply. The court stated that "the determinant whether
the first amendment applies to state libel actions is whether the
utterance involved concerns an issue of public or general con-
cern. . . ."18 However, the court left for future determination
exactly what would be considered "of public interest."
The court in Firestone followed Rosenbloom and found elec-
tronic eavesdropping to be a matter of public interest. Thus,
after the Rosenbloom and Firestone decisions the question re-
mains as to the limits of what may constitute "public interest."
Inasmuch as the court in Rosenbloom borrowed that term from
the right of privacy, an analysis of this tort action can perhaps
offer some clues as to the scope of "public interest.11
11. Id. at 280.
12. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
13. Id.
14. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
15. Id. at 31.
16. Id. at 44.
17. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Prtvaoy, 4 HAnv. L. Rzv. 193 (1890).
The court in Rosenbloom explained in a footnote that this article provided
the source for the term. 403 U.S. at 31 n.2.
1973]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The right of privacy is the youngest of tort actions, coming
into existence in the 1890's.18 It seeks to protect the interest one
has in being let alone and in not having his private affairs ex-
posed to public view.' 9 Unlike defamation, proof of falsity is
not a requisite to recovery for an invasion of the right of pri-
vacy, and truth is not a defense. The only defense is to urge
that the facts were not private, but were matters of public in-
terest.20 It was not a simple matter of determining wherein the
public interest lay. The courts had to determine the extent to
which the public would benefit from the publication of certain
facts; then they had to balance that benefit against the interest
of the individual in keeping the facts from the public. The de-
termination in each case was greatly affected by current notions
of decent society. These notions served as a guide in determining
those matters that were considered more intimate than others.
The more private or intimate the facts were, the greater the
public benefit had to be in order to make disclosure permissible.
In some cases the individual interest was found to be greater
than public interest: using the maiden name of a reformed pros-
titute in a motion picture dealing with her past;21 publishing
that a person owes money; 22 publishing an x-ray of a woman's
pelvic region in a medical journal;28 showing "before and after"
pictures of a physical infirmity;24 and showing a motion picture
of a caesarian birth.25 Conversely, in other cases it was found
that the public interest outweighed individual interest: publish-
ing the subsequent history of a child prodigy; 26 publishing a fac-
tually correct account of the murder of a woman's husband;27
18. It is generally conceded that the right of privacy had its beginning
with an 1890 article, Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
Rsv. 193 (1890).
19. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1938): "A person who unreasonably and
seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known
to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other."
20. Prosser divides the law of privacy into four separate torts: (1) ap-
propriation, (2) intrusion, (3) public disclosure of private facts, and (4)
false light. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971). Only public disclosure of
private facts is pertinent to this discussion.
21. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
22. Santeisteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Mr.
1962); Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d. 708 (1941).
23. Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. N.Y. 1939).
24. Griffin v. Medical Soc'y, 11 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
25. Feeney v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N.Y.S. 481 (1920).
26. Sidis v. F-R Publ. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
711 (1940).
27. Jenkins v. Dell Publ. Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958).
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disclosing the name of a boy declared delinquent for sexually as-
saulting his sister, where he had only one sister ;28 publishing
that a twelve-year-old had given birth to a child;29 and publish-
ing a picture of the mutilated body of plaintiff's daughter after
an automobile accident.Y°
This type of balancing certainly appears workable because
it is flexible enough to change as the notions of society in which
it operates change. It seems doubtful, however, that the balance
to be struck by the court in the future will be the same as that
developed in past privacy casts.31 As evidenced by Rosenbloom
and Firestone, much more weight is now being placed on the
right of the public to be informed rather than on the individual's
right of privacy. So far this new balance has arisen only in in-
stances of defamation by mass media and there are a few indi-
cations, at present, as to whether it will be applied to defama-
tion by private individuals.
William S. Strain
28. Hubbard v. Journal Publ. Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147 (1962).
29. Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
30. Kelly v. Post Publ. Co., 327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 286 (1951).
31. Further, it Is doubtful that this same balance will be struck in future
privacy cases, as implied in Time, Inc. v. HilZ, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). A magazine
article concerning a play which portrayed a family held hostage by escaped
convicts stated that the play was based entirely on an actual experience of
a certain family. The convicts who had held them captive had treated them
well, while the play, on the other hand, portrayed the convicts as vicious
and abusive. Neither the play nor the article presented the family in a
defamatory manner, but actually characterized them as heroes. The Hill
family sued the magazine for an Invasion of privacy based on NEW YORK
Crvu. RoHTs LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948). This statute protects people
from the unauthorized use of their names or pictures by others for com-
mercial purposes. The statute is a hybrid between the law of privacy and
defamation in that it does not require that the publication be defamatory,
but that it be false. The Court held that the incident was a matter of
public interest and applied the New York Times test. However, because of
the peculiar provisions of the statute, It cannot be said that this case en-
tirely disposes of the question of whether the New York Times test will be
applied to true privacy cases in the future.
